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LANGUAGE, LM;ITIMATION AND CONTROL: 
THE SOUTH A.I?FUCAN STAW AFTER '78 
The language of the Botha government has shifted away fron Verwoerdian ideological 
orthodoq in certain noteworthy ways, some more dramatic and sensationalist than 
others. In 1978, Prime Minister Botha warned White South Africans to "adapt or 
die". Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co-operation and Development, assured an American 
audience that "apartheid was dead", and grandly declared "war on the ~dompas'" . Of 
course, none of this has happened. Apartheid is alive and well, and the "dompas" 
lives on in peace. This kind of rhetorical flourish, then, has little real impact 
on attempts to promote the legitimacy of the South African state, except perhaps in 
certain overseas circles, where the pulse of apartheid is more faintly felt. The 
more interesting and important shifts in legitimatory rationale concern the criteria 
for so-called "effective government1' (l) , which substitute new standards and 
priorities for old ones. l'Pragmatismll now comes before the stubborn adherence to 
principles for their own sake; "free enterprise" and "economic growth" take 
precedence over Afrikaner unity and an uncompromising racial separatism. The process 
of government is depicted as a "total strategy" in defence of "civilised values", 
rather than a moral crusade for the protection and preservation of racial 
identities. (2) 
None of these catch-phrases is altogether new. Each has its own separate 
history of meaning and usage. What is novel from about 1978 onwards is, fzrstly, 
the extent to which they are repeated and underlined and, secondly, the w w s  in 
which their discrete meanings are extended and refined by virtue of their mutua l  
interrelations. They are no longer discrete, isolatable formulae, but have begun 
to exhibit certain systematic connections in their meaning and application. To this 
extent, they can be seen as the rudiments of a new language of legitimation. (3) 
Still, the result is not an uncontested or full-scale ideological shift. 
Orthodox ideological slogans and symbols coexist with the new, as symptoms of an as 
yet unresolved struggle within the state to define the terms of its legitimacy. As 
Stanley Greenberg points out, the South African state is in the throes of an 
tlideologicaJ. ferment". (4) 
There is at the level of thought an on-going 
redefinition of basic terms that turns legitimation 
into a f'undamental battle-ground. ( 5 )  
Furthermore, these conflicts have continued to intensify, rather than abate, 
especially following the split in Nationalist ranks which culminated in the 
inauguration of the new ri&t-wing Conservative Party. 
This paper focuses on the ideological resources and pol i t ica l  strategies 
and alliances on the part  of the llreformistll contenders i n  this struggle. I am 
concerned to analyse the content of the new legitimatory language, and t o  account 
fo r  i t s  new found prominence. I have l e f t  a discussion of the ba t t l e  i t s e l f ,  and 
the likelihood of ideological victory fo r  the new discourse of pragmatic reform, 
fo r  the seminar i t s e l f .  
The argument of this paper is, therefore, structured as follows: 
1 )  a brief  analysis of post 1978 language of "effective government1', 
according t o  three main themes; 
2) an attempt t o  account fo r  i) why a new legitimatory rationale 
became necessary, and i i )  why it should have taken the specific 
form which it did. 
The New Lanauaae of Leaitimation 
In  terms of the new language of "reform", the major yardstick of the legitimacy of 
the s t a t e  i s  construed as instrumental rather than substantively moral. It i s  
held t o  be more important that  policies be "effective" than that  they conform t o  
fixed moral standards. 
The dimensions of such lleffectiveness" are elaborated i n  three related 
themes and sets  of symbols: 
1 )  llTechnocraticll rat ionali ty,  as I have labelled it. 
2) "Total Strategyf1 
3) "Free Enterprise" 
A s  I suggested ear l ier ,  the full (denotative and connotative) meanings of each of 
these themes i s  established i n  and through the i r  interrelations. Of course, this 
is not to say that the users of this pol i t ica l  language e i ther  perceive or  
manipulate the production of meaning i n  this fashion. The production of symbolic 
meaning i s  rooted in,  but also supersedes, the intentions and control of 
individuals or  groups. My method i n  the following discussion is  therefore to  
analyse the content of each theme i n  relat ion t o  the others, rather than to  track 
down the intentions of particular s t a t e  ideologues. 
Technocratic Rationali-tN 
This legitimatory theme comprises a dual cod tment ,  t o  prammtic reason, 
on the one hand, and t o  the importance of technical emert ise  i n  solving the 
country's problems, on the other. 
I n  terms of the first, the "effectiveness1' of the present South African 
s t a t e  derives from i ts  rea l i s t i c ,  pragmatic response to the fac t s  of the countryvs 
local  and international situation. According to an editorial  i n  Die Beeld ( a  
major pro-government Afrikaans newspaper) , fo r  example , 
I n  these times of sowing suspicion against Nationalist 
leaders, i t l s  good for  Nationalists t o  real ise  that  
our policies of r ea l i t y  - our only salvation - are 
based on the fac t s  and t ruths as the Nationalist Party 
faces them fearlessly, under M r  P W Botha and 
Mr F W De ICLerk. ( 6 )  
It was i n  these terms that  Botha defended Nationalist Party policy to  the National 
Women's Club of Parliament, fo r  example: 
The acceptance of multinationalism, the recognition 
of minorities, the existence of various cultures, 
ideas and traditions i s  not an ideology, it  is a 
reali ty.  We did not create it, we experience it. 
It i s  a r ea l i t y  we have to take into account. (7) 
Apparently, therefore, 'lmultinationalismll (ethnic pol i t ica l  , cultural and social I 
I segregation) is  not a value or  norm fostered by the Nationalist Party; it i s  an 
objective fact ,  the logical and self-evident response to  which i s  a policy of I 
segregation. I n  terms of this discourse, apartheid thus acquires the ful l  weight of 
rea l i ty  behind it; it i s  neither chosen for, nor subject to, moral or  ideological 
I considerations. I 
l 
I The process of llreformll, too, i s  similarly depicted. The 1981 Election 
Manifesto of the Nationalist Party declares that  
The economic r ea l i t i e s  ... require more skil led 
labourers than the White' population can supply . . . 
These developments have necessitated various reforms 
i n  the f i e ld  of labour relations, and constitutional 
developments, and i n  the normal day-to-day contact 
between people of different race groups i n  South 
Africa. (8) 
The reforms designed to  solve South Africa's economic, pol i t ica l  and social problems 
are thus purported to  be independent of any particular "ideology" or normative 
pol i t ica l  stance. They are simply read off unequivocally and self-evidently, from 
the "facts" of the case. 
Indeed, the role of so-called "ideology" or avowedly pol i t ica l  principles 
i s  expressly underplayed, even denounced altogether. Challenges to  government policy 
on "ideological grounds" are discredited as "petty party pol i t ica l  point-scoring". (9) 
The unconditional adherence to  any such principles i s  dismissed as r ig id  and backward- 
looking, a dangerous fa i lure  t o  take account of changing times and an obstacle t o  the 
business of "intel l igent policy-making and purposive reform". (10) Thus, llideologicalll 
principles are not only unnecessary, because the policies of reform simply record and 
react to  facts; they are also dangerous. 
This commitment to  "policies of real i tyn,  not llideology", goes hand i n  hand 
with technocratic standards of legitimate decision-making. For, the "realityf1 with 
which the s t a t e  has to  deal i s  depicted as complex and multifaceted, spawning many l 
complicated llproblemsll. Since the task of an "effective government" i s  to  produce 
the objectively appropriate solutions necessitated by the facts  of the case, the 
s ta te  ought therefore to  ca l l  upon a wide range of special ists ,  able to  contribute 
independent, re l iable  and expert advice, untainted by any " ideo l~gica l '~  or  pol i t ica l  
stance. 
Problems of industrial  decentralization and homeland "development", influx 
control and urban African housing, fo r  example, are cast  i n  these terms, as 
engendered by the facts  of "economic growth11 and "industrialization". Properly 
problems of po l i t i ca l  control, they are presented as i f  merely technical ones, the 
solutions t o  which can, and should, be devoid of "ideology" or pol i t ica l  
principle. (11) Such solutions are thus seen to  devolve upon the advice and 
findings of business "experts1', rather than on the resul ts  of popular pol i t ica l  
debate and choice. 
The t a c i t  effect  of t h i s  new legitimatory rationale i s  thus to redefine 
the scope of the country's avowedly pol i t ica l  agenda. Large areas of s ta te  control 
such as i ts  homeland policies or allocations to urban African housing- depoliticized 
by being depicted i n  pragmatic and technical terms, which disclaim the i r  pol i t ica l  
contestability and import. 
Total Strategy 
The new pol i t ica l  language of "reform" upholds the "effectiveness" of the 
present South African s t a t e  i n  i ts  "total  strategy" against a multifarious " tota l  
onsla@t" on the country. The notion of a "total  onslaught" seems t o  have entered 
the ideological arena by the early 19709, propagated by the military, as the rather 
diffusely conceived threat of "international communism and i ts  cohorts - l e f t i s t  
ac t iv is ts ,  exaggerated humanism, permissiveness, materialism and related 
ideologies". (12) This theme of a " tota l  onslaught" against the s t a t e  and a " tota l  
strategy" necessary to  defeat it, i s  now dominant i n  many qparters of the state. 
"Total strategy" is not simply an aspect of government policy; it is the 
symbol of, and just if ication for,  the scope and s tyle  of s t a t e  control as a whole. 
In the terms of the new discourse i t s e l f ,  
Total strategy ... can be described as the 
comprehensive plan to  u t i l i z e  all the means 
available to  a s t a t e  according to an integrated 
pattern i n  order to  achieve the national a i m s  
within the framework of specific policies. A 
to ta l  national strategy is, therefore, not confined 
to  a particular sphere, but i s  applicable a t  all 
levels and to  all f'unctions of the s ta te  structure. (13) 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the f u l l  meaning of the current l l to ta l  
stragegy" idea emerges i n  relat ion to  the preceding theme of "pra.gnatic realism1'. 
For, the scope of " tota l  strategyf1 is  seen to encompass whatever i s  objectively 
"ne~essary'~ fo r  the "effective" solution to  the problems of the moment. The only 
appropriate constraint on the magnitude and content of this strategy should be 
"realism" i n  the face of the "facts". Otherwise the s t a t e  is  seen t o  need a free 
hand, unfettered by llideologicalll principles, to  pursue whichever strategies are 
deemed "necessary" by those acquainted with the facts  and equipped with the 
appropriate expertise. 
A large part of this " tota l  strategy" is, of course, military. On this 
score, the two themes of "technocratic reason" and " tota l  strategyf1 interlock i n  
such a way as to  approve a much enlarged role for  senior military personnel i n  c iv i l  
government, i n  the i r  capacity as "experts" i n  matters of " to ta l  strategy", dealing 
only with the "facts" of the " tota l  onslaught". 
The " tota l  strategy" required fo r  "effective government" i s  not wholly 
military, however. It also encompasses a commitment to  "free enterprise", designed 
to  deflate the appeal of the communist "onslaught" to South Africavs "non-White" 
population. The meaning of the term "free enterprise" i s  thus i n t e p a l l y  bound up 
with the idea of " to ta l  strategy", and i n  turn with the stanckcds of technological 
rationality. 
Many commentators on South Africa's future have argued that  the s ta te  would 
seek to  extend i ts  base of popular consent to certain African,Coloured and Indian 
groups (notably, a middle class and a labour aristocracy) by easing certain pol i t ica l  
restr ict ions on thei r  economic opportunities, and adopting the gloss of a l iberal  
free enterprise ideology to  disclaim and conceal these strategies of control i n  the 
name of individual r ights and happiness. (14) However, while many of these co-optive 
strategies are i n  evidence, they tend not t o  be obscured by such ethical  screens. 
For the vocabulary of "free enterprise" has developed along a different route, 
directed in part by the discourse of "total strategy". Thus the extension of the 
"free enterprise" system to sectors of the "non-white" population is depicted 
emlicitly as a strategy of co-optation and control, i.e. in the terms of the 
official discourse itself, as part of the state's "fotal strategy" to subvert 
"leftist activism" in the country. In P W Bothavs words, 
We hope to create a middle class among all the 
nations of South Africa. Because, if a man has 
possession and is able to build his family life 
around those possessions, then one has already 
succeeded in laying the foundation for resisting 
C o d s m .  If anyone has something to protect, 
to keep as his own, then he fights Communism more 
readily. (15) 
In traditionally liberal variants of "free enterprise" ideology, the 
capitalist system is represented as optimally free of state intervention, being 
properly self-regulating, according to the politically neutral logic of the market. 
Again, however, the South African version of "free enterprise" is different. By 
means of its relation to the other themes of technocratic rationality and "total 
strategy", the idea of "free enterprise" provides a means of defending the fact of 
state intervention in the market, on the one hand, and a high degree of 
participation by big business in the affairs of the state, on the other. Since 
"free enterprise" is part of the statevs "total strategy", the state can claim a 
legitimate vested interest in the promotion and regulation of the market, according 
to the "realities" of the moment. (16) At the same time, the intervention on the 
part of businessmen in governmental processes is justified as an appropriate 
contribution of expertise and capital, neither of which is depicted as 
a political commodity. They are construed as merely instrumental contributions to 
technical problems of "growth" and "development". It is on such grounds that the 
Botha government openly urges businessmen to "play a more active role in helping 
to solve the development problems in Southern Africa". (17) 
Having identified the interrelations between three main themes of the new 
language of legitimation, the next question to be addressed is: Why should there 
have been such marked changes in legitimatory rationale promulgated within the 
state, from 1978 onwards? 
An answer to this question lies in the structural crisis (18) of the 
state which developed during the 1970s, producing the need for reforms of the sort 
which would undercut the legitimatory credibility of orthodox Verwoerdian ideology, 
at the very time at which the process of ideological legitimation had taken on a 
new, added salience in the prospects for the "management" of the crisis. A new 
language of legitimation became not simply an historical possibility but a strategic 
priority. 
Crisis of the 1970s 
( M ~  discussion of this period is extremely brief, and aims merely to hi-ight some 
of the main features of the crisis relevant to our inquiry into the changing 
language of legitimation.) (19) 
The 1970s saw the Verwoerdian blueprint of apartheid fall increasingly out 
of joing with certain economic and political developments, to the point where, in 
in the mid-1970s the state's economic and political stability was seriously threatened. 
Existing political and economic arrangements were shown to be inadequate for the 
effective renewal of state control and support. 
For example, major problems were thrown up on the labour front. South 
Africa's labour policies were constituted a t  a time when Blacks were required 
largely as a source of cheap, unskilled labour. Skilled and semi-skilled positions, 
being s t i l l  relat ively small i n  number, could thus remain the preserve of Whites. 
However, as  capitalism advanced to  i ts  monopoly stage, so i t s  labour needs changed 
from those originally envisaged and protected by the state.  Monopoly production 
i n  South Africa i s  often capital-intensive, and has seen the introduction of 
sophisticated technology, the operation of which requires a skil led and semi-skilled 
work force. A s  such production expanded, through the 1960s and 1970s, the White 
population was no longer able to meet the market's demand for  skil led and semi- 
skil led labour. Even i n  the 1960s,in fact ,  this demand f a s t  outgrew the supply from 
amongst Whites. However, as Dan O'Meara points out (20), serious adverse effects 
of t h i s  shortage were f e l t  only from the early 1970s onwards. For, the 1960s s a w  
an economic boom during which "the overall conditions of expansion and high 
prof i tabi l i ty  mitigated the adverse effects of such labour shortagesw. (21) The 
1970s, on the other hand, were marked by a deepening recession, so that the still- 
growing shortage of skills then did begin to pose a significant threat t o  the 
interests  of capital. 
Satisfactory economic progress thus came to  be seen to  depend increasingly 
on an enlargement of the source of skills, from amongst the "non-White" population. 
This i n  turn required an erosion of job reservation on grounds of colour, the 
extension of training f ac i l i t i e s ,  and the stabil ization of conditions of employment 
and residence of such workers, because, once trained, they are more d i f f i cu l t  and 
expensive to replace. In other words, then, the solution to  the growing problem of 
a shortage of sk i l l s  came to devolve upon the creation and stabil ization of a labour 
e l i t e  amongst Africans, Coloureds and Indians. 
The 1970s also produced a large increase i n  the numbers of unemployed, 
which the ra te  of economic growth could not redress. (22) A s  the drive towards 
capital-intensive production advanced m t h e r  during this period, so the 
unemployment problem was compounded, as the relat ive need for  unskilled labour 
continued to decline. 
Nor did the threats to  the country's economic s tab i l i ty  and prosperity 
stop there. The decade w a s  one of mounting opposition and unrest, both on 
pol i t ica l  and labour fronts. Numerous and widespread str ikes,  from 1972 onwards, 
underlined the inadequacy of wholly repressive controls over the predominantly 
African work-force, and served to  expose the need for  additional, co-optive controls 
to  defuse dissent. A stable, consensual, skilled and semi-skilled labour force had 
become especially crucial,  i n  view of the worsening shortage. It was thus all the 
more necessary to  prevent spreading s t r ikes  and discontent within these ranks. 
Nor w a s  dissent confined to  the economic arena. The growing urban African 
and Coloured population demonstrated intense and widespread resistance to  apartheid, 
beginning with the 1976 Soweto r io ts .  
. This marked intensification of protest had a damaging effect  on the 
already scamed economy. For, periods of unrest were followed by sigmificant 
reductions i n  the levels of foreign investment i n  the country and an exodus of 
foreign capital already i n  the country. A s  a result ,  South Africa' S existing balance 
of payments defici t  was compounded by loss  of the capital  necessary t o  sponsor her 
imports. The s ta te  thus grew increasingly unable to afford the costs of prolonged l 
unrest. 
Developments i n  the 1970s, then, exposed the economic and pol i t ica l  
necessity for  improvements i n  the s ta te ' s  capacity to  deter unrest, as well as to  
meet the problems of unemployment and sk i l l s '  shortage - all of which jeopardized 
continued economic growth and pol i t ica l  s tabi l i ty .  I n  this way, furthermore, the 
decade had brought the interests of the government, military and monopoly capital 
together, in their common need for reforms which would "manage" the crisis. The 
interests of each would be served simultaneously, by measures which stabilized and 
co-opted an African middle class and labour aristocracy, eased the skills shortage, 
and streamlined influx control so as to create a permanent, stable, M l y  employed 
urban African population and evict the swelling ranks of the unemployed to the 
homelands. 
Each of these strategies of reform, however, was at odds with the 
Verwoerdian blueprint, in terms of which Africans were to be denied trade union 
rights, and any permanent urban residential status at all. The 1970s thus laid 
the structural ground for the type of reforms which discredited the orthodox 
ideologicd legitimation of the state. The credibility of the new "reformistI1 
state would thus depend on the promulgation of a new 1anguag;e of self-legitimation. 
Furthermore, the need for such credibility amongst new African, Coloured and Asian 
audiences had also been growing during this decade. The increasing limitations and 
costs of the state's near-total reliance on coercive control over these groups had 
become unmistakably apparent. The government was therefore subject to mounting 
pressure to extend its base of popular consent, by establishing its legitimacy to 
"non-White" elites. These calls were especiaXly urgent from spokesmen for the 
military, local and foreign capital, all of whose interests would be favoured by an 
enlazgement of the ambit of state legitimacy. General Malan (then Defence Chief of 
staff), for example, stated plainly that "the lesson [of the unrest] is clear . . . 
we must take into account the aspirations of our population groups. We must gain 
and keep their trust." (23) 
The crisis of the 1970s thus exposes the structural conditions and 
strategic priority of a new legitimatory rationale for the state. However, it was 
only in 1978 that such change was inaugurated. The so-called "Muldergate" scandal 
during this year discredited the "verkrampte" faction within the state, and 
sponsored the ascendancy of the verligtes, under the leadership of P W Botha. More 
responsive than the Vorster regime to pressures for reform from the military and 
big business, it was this newly aligned state which undertook to "manage" the crisis 
it had inherited, by a series of "reforms". (24) 
Having accounted for the emergence of a new language of legitimation 
within the state from 1978 onwards, it remains for us to consider why these changes 
took the particular form of a discourse of technocratically effective, pragmatic 
government. 
An answer to this question lies at least in part, in the functions which 
this new legitimatory 1 can play i j as an instrument on control over the 
political agenda, and i r a  means of addressing different audiences with 
discrepant interests simultaneously. 
Control Over the Political Agenda 
The new 1- of legitimation defines the agenda of popular, public politics in 
a wa~r which facilitates and supports the dominant alliance of interests within the 
post-1978 state, as well as the maxmer in which state control is exercised. 
The 1978 realignments within the government have allowed for certain 
changes in the form of state control, giving public expression to the newly 
ascendant alliance of interests between verligte Nationalists, big business and the 
military. Firstly, overtly close collusion between the government and the militaxy 
has grown. Secondly, the Vorster government's attempt to keep big business at arm's 
length, at least in public, has been reversed. The state and big business 
collaborate publicly, setting themselves up as a "team1'. (25) (This is not 
necessarily an index of any real increase in political power on the part of 
monopoly capitalists, however. ) Thirdly, power is highly centralized in select 
areas of the executive, which has reduced the government's answerability to 
Parliament,on the one hand, and the party rank and file, on the other. 
Consider now how each of these features of the present South African 
state and its "reform1' strategies is served by the new legitimatory rationale that 
has won prominence. 
As our earlier discussion revealed, the Botha regime's reform initiative 
included certain strategies which had been expressly debarred by orthodox Separate 
Development policy, e.g. registration of African trade unions, stabilization of a 
permanent, albeit small, urban African population in "White1' South Africa, and a 
plan for "power sharing'' with Coloureds and Indians. Now, especially in view of 
the long history of dissension between verligtes and verkramptes within the 
Nationalist ranks, the verligte regime must have bown that it could not rely on 
unqualified support, either within the party or amidst predominantly verkrampte 
sectors of the state, such as parts of the bureaucracy. It is not surprising, then, 
that decision-making within the state should have become increasingly centralized 
and indifferent to Parliamentary or party dissension. Executive power is 
concentrated in a series of Cabinet Committees, appointed and answerable to the 
Prime Minister only. As O'Meare points out (and analyses in greater detail), "the 
entire principle of Cabinet responsibility has been shifted into the office of the 
Head of government, dramatically increasing his power". (26) 
The terms in which the new legitimatory rationale define the scope of 
popular (White) politics surely aid and abet this centralization of power in the 
executive. Tor, many of the planned reform strategies, such as those concerned with 
urban blacks, homeland development and industrial relations, are, in principle, 
highly contestable within party and electoral circles. Yet, by depicting these 
policies in the language of technocratic reason and "non-ideological" objectivity, 
the government can take the wind out of the sails of popular or party opposition. 
The democratic legitimacy of an elected government requires at least some measure 
of demonstrable popular ratification and support for political policies. The new 
language of legitimation prominent in certain state circles protects the legitimacy 
of the state amongst its electorate, simply by nazrowing the arena of its avowed 
politics. 
The support and co-operation of the military and big business, however, 
seem to be a more important prize for the Botha government to win and keep. 
Botha's style of government, facilitated by his reorganization of the 
executive, has greatly advanced the interests and role of the military in the arena 
of civil government. Members of Cabinet Committees (the power-house of the 
executive) need not be members of Parliament. Many senior military officers have 
thus been incorporated into these committees, which has led O'Meara, for one, to 
assert that "for the first time . . . the military has] a vitally important 
institutionalized role within the executive". (275 An article in the Financial 
Mail, too, reports a claim that "SADF representatives now take part in all 
interdepartmental meetings, regardless of whether direct SADF interests are 
involved" . (2 8) 
The interpenetration of civil and military spheres has been fhrthered, 
too, by the enhanced powers of the Department of Military Intelligence, which has 
largely ousted the Depaztment of National Security. (29) Finally, the National 
Security Council, a body established in 1977 to spearhead the state's "total 
strategy" (30 ) ,  is now the main advisory and planning body in the propagation of 
this strategy. 
Again, the new language of s ta te  legitimation seems to  have been 
instrumental i n  forging and sustaining t h i s  relationship between executive and 
military within the state.  It defines the scope of the s ta te ' s  " to ta l  strategy1' 
widely en& to  cover anything deemed by military and government "experts" 
themselves to  affect  national security. The inclusion of military personnel in to  
c iv i l  decision-making processes i s  promoted on the grounds of the i r  pol i t ica l ly  
and ideologically neutral expertise i n  such matters, and the i r  autonomy i n  
pursuing chosen strategies protected by the nominal depoliticization of these 
ac t iv i t i es  and concerns. 
The Botha government has made some noteworthy effor ts  t o  win legitimacy 
and support amongst monopoly capital ists .  Public overtures to  business t o  engage 
i n  "continuous consultation1' (31) with the government have been made thou& the 
Carlton Conference of 1979 and the Good Hope Conference of 1981, fo r  example, 
attended by leading business people and s ta te  actors. More significantly, leading 
businessmen have been incorporated in to  Cabinet Committees themselves, i n  the i r  
capacity as experts on such matters as economic development, labour relations, 
inflation, etc. Also, "teams" of business and government representatives have been 
se t  up to  d e d  with such problems as urban African housing, the promotion of 
capital accumulation amongst Africans, Coloureds and Asians, homeland development, 
e.g. the Small Businesses Development Corporation, Commission of Inquiry in to  
African Housing. (32) 
A s  I suggested ear l ier ,  it i s  hard to assess the extent of real  power 
exercised by business representatives i n  these ways. But it  seems certain that  
they now have a legitimate public pol i t ica l  platform from which to advance thei r  
interests ,  to  the extent that the government i s  willing. 
This poll  t i c a l  incorporation of leading business people, which seems to  
form part of the s ta te ' s  attempt to win and legitimate the support of English and 
Afrikaans business, has been sponsored by the language of technocratic and 
pragmatic rat ionali ty,  which depicts such "teamwork1' as pol i t ica l ly  neutral, 
ideologically indifferent and objectively necessary. Neither the s ta te  nor big  
business, especially English-speaking, could have afforded to  enter a relationship 
which w a s  not effectively depoliticized i n  this way. A s  f a r  as  the s ta te  i s  
concerned, any pol i t ica l  collaboration with English b ig  business would have 
jeopardized its ideological credibil i ty i n  Afrikaner Nationalist c i rc les  which 
still  remember 'lHoggenheimerl' (Harry ~~penheimer) as the symbol of the l iberal  
capi ta l is t  threat to  Afrikaner interests. Liberal business leaders, fo r  thei r  part,  
could not afford the threat to  the i r  party pol i t ica l  credibil i ty i f  seen t o  engage 
i n  a po l i t i ca l  alliance with the Nationalists. A language for  mutual address 
which is  purely technical and n ~ n - ~ ~ i d e o l o g i c a l ~ ~  h s, therefore, been a necessary 
condition and instrument i n  the development of t h i s  relationship. 
Strategies fo r  Ehla;rRina Consent 
Traditionally, popular consent to  the South African s ta te  had been confined to the 
exclusively White, predominantly Afrikaans, supporters of the Nationalist Party. 
Events of the 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  however, had starkly exposed the price of such a narrow base 
of popular support. It w a s  shown to  produce growing opposition from local  and 
foreign capital,  overseas governments, African, Coloured and Indian workers and 
comruunity leaders. A t  the same time, existing support from the r ight  wing of the 
Nationalist party could not be w a n t e e d ,  once non-Verwoerdian reforms were 
init iated.  
T h i s  reform strategy on the part of the Botha regime seems thus to  have 
included an attempt both t o  renew and t o  extend the base of popular consent, by 
newly promoting the legitimacy of the state. 
In the strategic planning of South Africa, it is 
accepted in the defence of the country, only 20h 
can be achieved by military preparedness; the 
other 8076 depends on spiritual prepazedness. (33) 
The ffBroederbond'f, one of the state's ideological think-tanks, saw that 
the requisite legitimation strategy had to be one which would placate Whites, and 
Afrikaners in particular, in the face of changes which would erode certain existing 
White privileges (e.g. job reservation), and persuade them that their own interests 
were still being upheld. Yet, the terms of this ideological reassurance were also 
restricted by the nature of the other audiences to which the new language of 
legitimation was also to be spoken. For, firstly, the base of populas consent was 
to be extended to include sections at least of the African, Coloured and Asian 
population. Botha made the point plainly at a public meeting in Springbok. 
Speaking of South Afkica's "non-Whites", he asked his audience rhetorically, 
Must I estrange these people, or must I take them 
with me so that the country's security can be 
maintained? (34) 
Legitimation of the state could never be won amongst these people as long as the 
language used by state actors smacks remotely of racism, or,indeed, of mything 
which betrays a persistent adherence to Verwoerdian principles and values. The 
minirm condition for exacting their consent is a promise of reform, which advances 
their interests and status. 
Another audience to be addressed by the state's new language of 
legitimation, big business, accounts for a further set of constraints on the 
content of this language. As we have seen, certain reforms, which deviate from the 
orthodox apartheid blueprint (e.g. registration of African unions, erosion of job 
reservation) are clearly in the interests of most organs of monopoly capital. Big 
businessmen are therefore amongst the most strenuous proponents of a need for such 
adaptive strategies on the part of the state. For them, too, it is language of 
reform which can best make the state's case for its legitimacy. Furthermore, in 
order for the collaboration between organs of government and big business, in 
pursuit of these reforms, to remain publicly legitimate, the state required a 
language which could address such audiences as a business community alone. As we 
have already seen, unless the terms of their relationship side-stepped issues of 
party politics and principles, the party political credibility of both Nationalist 
and capitalist llteam" members would be endangered. 
Clearly, therefore, the chosen strategy of legitimating the state to all 
of these audiences simultaneously could be conducted only in a language which spoke 
of reform, while avoiding or repressing the issues of ffideologicalll principle 
altogether. If any references had been made to substantive principles or ethical 
norms, the open and collective collaboration with the government by capitalists of 
varying party political persuasions would have embarrassed and alienated many of 
the latter. Also, a language of flideologicalfl or political principle would 
inevitably have failed to achieve legitimatory success in Afrikaner and African, 
Coloured and Indian audiences simultaneously. For, if the political and 
"ideological" values in question were clearly congruent with traditional Verwoerdian 
ones so as to appease the Nationalist electorate, the newly courted African, 
Coloured and Indian audiences would have been alienated once more. To win their 
support on grounds of political or ffideologicalfl rinci le would have required the 
endorsement of a newly non-discriminatory l i b e r a l p e t  least), which the 
Nationalist right wing had repeatedly rejected. 
We have seen how and why,during the late 1970~1, the extended legitimation 
of the state had become a strategic priority. We can now recognize the ways in 
which the new language of technocratic reason, "total strategy" and "free 
enterprisett was ideally suited t o  the job. For, i t s  overall effect  i s  precisely 
to  repress issues of "ideological" or  pol i t ica l  principle, substituting an 
alternative instrumental yardstick of s ta te  legitimacy instead. It offers a 
defence of the present South African s ta te  as  one committed to  reform through 
"policies of reality" which have nothing to  do with issues of ttideological" 
principle. 
To conclude, I have argued, then, that  the specific content of the new 
legitimatory rationale prominent i n  the post-1978 South African s ta te  can be 
accounted for, a t  l eas t  i n  part,  by i ts  contribution to the s ta te ' s  strategies of 
"cr is is  management". For, on the one hand, the new rationale embodies a language 
which fac i l i t a tes  and protects the dominant alliance of in teres ts  within the post- 
1978 s ta te  (viz. between verl igte Nationalists, monopoly capital  and the military). 
And, on the other hand, i ts  aprincipled vocabulary can operationalize the s ta te ' s  
strategy to  extend the renew i t s  legitimacy to  different audiences with conflicting 
interests  and priori t ies.  
I am not arguing, however, that  the production and use of a new language 
of technoc~atic reason, t o t a l  strategy and free enterprise were thus a well devised 
and orchestrated conspiracy on the part of shrewd s ta te  ideologues. Adam and 
Giliomee are correct i n  pointing out that  
To conceive of an ideology as being consciously 
invented by a brain t rus t  o r  some other deliberate 
conspiracy would be misleading. A legitimating 
rationale gradually emerges through constant 
repeti t ion and refinement by opinion makers. A 
new f o m l a  'catches on1 while older interpretations 
fade out because it bet ter  ref lects  the changing 
needs of i ts  adherents. (35) 
My argument imputes neither f u l l  knowledge nor conspiratorial intent  to  the 
proponents of the new legitimatory rationale (although there i s  clearly a degree of 
deliberation and calculation i n  evidence, on the part of certain s ta te  actors a t  
leas t ) .  Rather, I have attempted to  account fo r  the fact  that  certain new 
"formulaett have "caught ontt i n  many quarters of the s ta te ,  largely i n  terms of the 
ways i n  which they ref lect  the needs and interes ts  of the dominant alliance within 
the state.  
Whether or  not the new language of legitimation does, or ever can, 
succeed i n  fu l f i l l i ng  these needs i s  another question, of course - one whish I 
w i l l  raise i n  the seminas i t s e l f .  
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